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 
Abstract— Growing popularity of multimedia applications, 
pervasive connectivity, higher bandwidth, and euphoric 
technology penetration among bulk of the human race that 
happens to be cellular technology users, has fueled the adaptation 
to Long Term Evolution (LTE)/ System Architecture Evolution 
(SAE). The LTE fulfills the resource demands of the next 
generation applications for now. We identify security issues in 
authentication mechanism used in LTE that without 
countermeasures might give super user rights to unauthorized 
users. The LTE uses static LTE Key (LTE-K) to derive the entire 
key hierarchy, i.e., LTE follows Evolved Packet System – 
Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) based 
authentication, which discloses user identity, location, and other 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII). To counter this, we 
propose a public key cryptosystem named “International mobile 
subscriber identity Protected Console Grid based Authentication 
and Key Agreement (IPG-AKA) protocol” to address the 
vulnerabilities related to weak key management. From the data 
obtained from threat modeling and simulation results, we claim 
that the IPG-AKA scheme not only improves security of 
authentication procedures, it also shows improvements in 
authentication loads and reduction in key generation time. The 
empirical results and qualitative analysis presented in this paper 
proves that IPG-AKA improves security in authentication 
procedure and performance in the LTE.  
 
Index Terms— Authentication, IMSI, LTE-A, Security, System 
Architecture Evolution, PKI. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
obile devices are pervasive and popular. Their extensive 
adaptation and versatility in usage have triggered an 
ever-growing increase in demand for network bandwidth. To 
meet these demands, network operators are carrying on 
extensive upgradation of their network infrastructure around 
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the globe. The Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard is a 4G 
wireless communication technology that provides a wide 
coverage area and offers high-speed data and wide network 
bandwidth [1]. Due to network spectral efficiency and 
capability, LTE is expected to be the backbone technology for 
the next generation networks including emergency response 
systems and worldwide interoperable public safety systems. 
The LTE standard has evolved from 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP) which helped other standards to 
grow, i.e., High-Speed Packet Access (HSPA), System 
Architecture Evolution (SAE), and LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), 
etc.  
LTE technology can support both enterprise and ordinary 
consumers. Though with several advantages, LTE has 
vulnerabilities and security loopholes making it a sizable 
target for cybercriminals [6, 7]. These vulnerabilities and 
loopholes require intensive considerations from research and 
development community. The list of frequently used 
abbreviated terminologies in this manuscript is presented as 
Table 1. 
The LTE-SAE network architecture constitutes of two 
prominent components: 
1.  Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network  
(E-UTRAN): The first part comprises of one or more evolved 
NodeBs (eNB) which is accountable for effective radio 
transmission and reception from/to the mobile users 
respectively. 
2. Evolved Packet Core (EPC): The EPC provides the 
subscriber a session keying material for the respective eNBs. 
It also holds long term keys that are used for authentication 
and establishment of security associations. 
TABLE I 
FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS 
Acronym Explanation 
LTE Long Term Evolution 
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
CK 
IK 
Cipher Key (CK) 
Integrity Key (IK) 
MME Mobility Management Entity 
HSS Home Subscriber Server 
UE User Equipment 
LTE – K LTE Key 
eNB evolved NodeB 
EPS-AKA Evolved Packet System Authentication and 
Key Agreement 
AV Authentication Vector 
C-GRID Console GRID 
IPG-AKA IMSI Protected C-GRID based AKA 
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UE MME HSS
      IMSI, SN Identity, 
Network Type
Access request
Generate AV; 
RAND, AUTN, 
XRES, KASME 
Authentication data response
(AV(s): RAND, AUTN, 
XRES, KASME)
AUTN = SQN Ɵ AK || 
MAC 
MAC = f1 (K, SQN || 
RAND) 
XRES = f2 (K, RAND) 
CK = f3 (K, RAND) IK 
= f4(K,RAND) KASME = 
KDF(SNID – ID, CK || IK)
User authentication 
request
RAND, AUTN, 
KSIASME 
Verify AUTN 
and Compute RES 
User authentication 
response
Compute CK and 
IK, and KASME 
Compare RES 
and XRES 
Authentication data request
      IMSI, SN Identity, 
Network Type
Major elements of a typical EPC are Mobility Management 
Entity (MME), Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF), 
Serving Gateway, Packet Data Networks (PDN) gateway, and 
Home Subscriber Server (HSS). 
The session keys provide cryptographic protection to the 
session between User Equipment (UE) and E-UTRAN. Hence,  
protection of all the session keys is important and critical for 
integrity of the communication within. The keys that are 
stored in eNBs, should be restricted only to their active 
operational domain. 
The key generation and their verification in E-UTRAN are 
performed through Evolved Packet System Authentication and 
Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) [7, 8]. We analyze that EPS-
AKA protocol for LTE has numerous security issues. For 
instance: When a UE enters the LTE’s eNB communication 
area, a mutual authentication between UE and MME is 
initiated, where Authentication Vectors (AV) containing 
[RANDom Number (RAND), AUThenticatioN Token (AUTN)] 
is shared with UE in unencrypted format [1, 9]. As RAND is a 
key parameter in Non-Access Stratum (NAS)-encryption key 
generation, an intruder who gains access to the unencrypted 
authentication vector can compromise the entire LTE 
connection. During every UE access request to LTE network, 
the Access Security Management Entity (ASME) in MME 
performs access security and EPS-AKA based key distribution 
functionalities [9, 10]. Even though EPS-AKA is claimed to 
be safe and efficient, it suffers from identity attacks, high 
bandwidth utilization, and communication cost [11]. Another 
major problem is absence of an appropriate authentication 
mechanism to avoid Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
theft through International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
exposure. 
The IMSI is the piece of information that is primarily 
responsible for the identification of a subscriber on a cellular 
network and is unambiguously related to a given UE. It is 
conjointly used for getting different details of the mobile unit 
within the Home Location Register (HLR) directly or within 
the Visitor Location Register (VLR) as regionally derived. To 
prevent eavesdropping and other attacks on the radio interface, 
the IMSI is sent as rarely as possible. Unique identity of a 
subscriber is known through the IMSI that helps to fetch the 
user subscribed services and location [1-6, 12]. As shown in 
Fig. 1[3], first three digits of IMSI are the Mobile Country 
Code (MCC) followed by the Mobile Network Code (MNC) 
and Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN). The 
information of IMSI is also contained in the Universal 
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) / IP Multimedia Services 
Identity Module (ISIM) card. 
The IMSIs are typically used by the network operator to 
examine the subscribers whether to allow the subscriber to use 
another network operator service or not. The IMSIs are 
usually transmitted as plaintext on air as shown in Fig. 2 [6]. 
This leads to a range of security issues like location leak 
attacks, insider attack and lack of privacy preservation [46]. 
These attacks exploit the execution flaws in LTE Radio 
Resource Control (RRC) protocol. This reconnaissance may 
result into an active attack [7]. In IMSI based active attack the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Components of IMSI [3] 
precise location of the mobile user is identified using 
trilateration as well as Global Positioning System (GPS) 
coordinates. Moreover, Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) and Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks in LTE persist due to IMSI 
vulnerability [13]. In the LTE network, EPS-AKA performs 
key management operations. Once the source key (LTE-K) is 
compromised [11], the whole key hierarchy becomes 
vulnerable as LTE-K is the seed for subsequent key 
derivatives. This LTE-K based vulnerability is coined as a 
single key problem in [14, 15]. 
In this paper, we address the IMSI protection and static 
single key problem by proposing Identity (IMSI) Protected 
Console GRID (C-GRID) based Authentication & Key 
Agreement (IPG-AKA). It protects the IMSI using a public 
key based cryptosystem and solves the single static key 
problem that prevails in existing approaches like SE-AKA and 
EPS-AKA by utilizing a look-up table based approach. The 
IMSI protection in IPG-AKA is achieved by sending it as a 
cipher with a minimal number of network handshake 
messages and the proposed C-GRID acts as a seed for the 
LTE-K key hierarchy thereby solving the single key problem. 
The IPG-AKA outperforms EPS-AKA and compuationally 
less stranous to the middleware, because seamlessly 
imsersable and vividly scalable in the exisitng infrstrucutre. 
We used AVISPA tool with different attacker model such as 
chosen ciphertext attack, side channel attack, known plaintext 
attack and ciphertext only attack for the analysis. 
Fig. 2.  EPS-AKA message exchange in LTE 
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This analysis prove that our protocol is secure against these 
attacks. Moreover, in comparison to EPS-AKA scheme, IPG-
AKA improves security by 30%. Therefore, we can claim that 
IPG-AKA is secure against attacks and addresses the IMSI 
protection and static single key problems. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section II, 
we present the literature review. In section III, we propose the 
LTE architecture that is equipped with the IPG-AKA. A 
discussion on privacy protection achieved through IMSI 
protected IPG-AKA is presented in section IV. In section V, 
we present the security analysis of IPG-AKA and performance 
analysis of the protocol in section VI. We present the 
concluding remarks in section VII. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Authentication is one of the most challenging security 
issues in advanced networks. The authentication process in 
LTE networks is primarily handled by EPS-AKA. Firstly, we 
will discuss the LTE authentication [1, 3, 5, 16] process using  
EPS-AKA. The LTE being a flat IP-based architecture is more 
prone to SQL injection, eavesdropping, IP address spoofing, 
MitM and PII theft [11], hence, the authentication process 
takes place at UE connection, call initiation, call termination, 
call handover, area updating etc. Also, numerous eNBs are 
managed by MME, and eNBs called low-cost base stations 
provide a direct path to malicious attackers. Once an adversary 
compromises the eNB, it can compromise the entire LTE 
access to the network [10, 14, 17].  
A considerable volume of research is reported on the 
authentication [5, 35-41, 48] and on key agreement [18, 42-
46] process to overcome the security gap that needs 
improvement in the recently proposed symmetric [13], and 
asymmetric security solutions [17]. Machine learning based 
authentication [2, 4, 46] and aggregation [47] is proposed to 
overcome the security flaws in the dynamic environments. 
Various security flaws in EPS-AKA are addressed in the 
literature. Firstly, false base station attack which is a 
redirection attack where a UE’s attack request is redirected 
from the intended network to other networks separated by a 
long distance [19]. Secondly, the impersonation attack where 
an intruder is given a corrupted AV to impersonate any 
legitimate user [11, 19, 20]. Thirdly, usage of synchronization 
approach among UE and HSS where if periodic 
synchronization fails, it leads to synchronization error and 
communication failure [19, 20]. 
A derived AP-AKA mechanism to address these issues was 
proposed in which the UEs had the flexibility to select the 
authentication execution flow [20]. But the UE’s serving 
network authentication was completely dependent on the 
home network server for performing the AV distribution when 
AVs were exhausted or key materials expired. In home 
networks, this approach certainly increases the computation 
load at the server and incurs access delay for mobile users. 
Another approach named X-AKA, an extension of Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System Authentication and Key 
Agreement (UMTS-AKA) protocol was proposed to reduce 
the AV transmission overhead to improve bandwidth 
utilization in the standard EPS-AKA mechanism [21]. In this 
approach, a symmetric key based mechanism focuses on 
minimal bandwidth consumption and communication 
overhead to generate AV at the serving network instead of the 
home network [22]. However, these mechanisms do not 
prevent redirection and MitM attacks. For an environment 
with a large number of users, a secure group key approach 
incurs authentication delay due to numerous re-key 
construction requests and the extensive pre-processing steps 
involved in it [23]. 
An authentication and key agreement protocol were 
proposed for a group of mobile users who moves from a home 
network to the serving network.  The reported results show 
near optimal authentication performance by compromising 
security [24, 25]. Message integrity protection against signal 
cancellation has been proposed using Manchester coding [3]. 
An execution environment adaptive protocol is proposed in 
[26] to reuse the available authentication vectors but the 
protocol is vulnerable to MitM, DoS, redirection, and PII 
compromise attacks. Introduction of public key based 
approaches will possibly be a way towards improving LTE 
security [28, 29]. The IMSI catcher is a hardware equipment 
that acquires all the IMSIs accessible close to it and are sent 
over the radio without encryption. The IMSI catching is 
avoided by securing IMSIs [30] but still location tracking and 
LTE-K vulnerability persists. In the LTE network, LTE-K is 
the source key from which the entire key hierarchy is derived 
to secure the full LTE communication [27]. If this LTE-K is 
compromised [11] at any level of communication, the whole 
key hierarchy becomes vulnerable. Our analysis of the key 
hierarchy reveals that the existing LTE networks are prone to 
compromise due to weak key management. This LTE-K based 
vulnerability is coined as a single key problem [14, 15]. So 
far, there are no sufficient solutions towards LTE security 
vulnerabilities.  
Thus, major security issues like IMSI exposure and LTE-K 
attack poses active thread to PII. Public key based 
cryptosystem can address this issue; however, they only 
resolve half of the problem and single key problem still holds. 
With IPG-AKA, we aim to resolve this issue using a table 
based approach and by making key dynamic. Even if the 
adversary found the LTE-K derived through IPG-AKA, it 
cannot be reused to hack the entire network. The randomness 
of bit sequence generated through C-GRID makes it difficult 
to reuse in the entire network for the hacker, thereby making 
IPG-AKA a robust solution for handling single key problem of 
PII. 
III. THE LTE ARCHITECTURE WITH IPG-AKA 
The LTE architecture comprises of primarily two 
components:  EPC and EUTRAN. To ensure the integrity of 
the master key, we incorporate additional resources in IPG-
AKA based authentication system in existing LTE 
architecture. The changes are kept to the least to minimize the 
effects on the existing architecture as shown in Fig. 3. The 
EPC framework includes LTE radio base stations (eNB) [31, 
47] that connect to the control plane components such as 
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MME, User Plane Gateways such as Packet Data Network 
Gateway (PDN-GW) & Serving GW (SGW). The MME acts 
as a Key Distributor (KD) [3-9] in the LTE. The EPS network 
holds both MME and SAE [1, 2] and connects these two to the 
E-UTRAN entities over the many-to-many interface via HSS. 
A mutual handshake between the UE and the EPC is the 
most important security feature in the LTE security 
framework. Secure communication between EPC and UE 
takes place by sending a mutual authentication parameter of 
EPS-AKA over the network. Consequently, the UE 
communicates with the EPC through E-UTRAN networks. 
The UE communicates with the Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN) through the 3GPP or E-UTRAN access 
networks via the EPC. The LTE supports the communication 
between the EPC and Non-3GPP network. However, there are 
two types of Non-3GPP access networks, namely trusted Non-
3GPP access networks, and untrusted Non-3GPP access 
networks. 
Based on policy enforced by the LTE network operator, a 
network is defined to be trustworthy or untrustworthy. 
Usually, for the Non-3GPP access networks, the UE 
communicates with the Authentication Authorization & 
Accounting (AAA) server by sending an untrusted Non-3GPP 
authentication SWa interface and trusted Non-3GPP 
authentication STa over the networks. The replication of the 
AAA server (proxy AAA server) is used for authenticating 
signaling during communication. So, for a trusted Non-3GPP 
the UE and the AAA server together send an EPS-AKA 
signaling, whereas, in untrusted Non-3GPP, the UE sends 
through an evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) for 
confidence over the network to the EPC. The UE and the 
ePDG perform IP security tunnel establishment known as 
Internet Key Exchange v2 (IKEv2) with EPS-AKA.  During 
tunneling, the UE and the AAA server receives 
communication from EPC mutual authentication of the user 
and the EPC. 
The LTE is fully optimized for packet data access and it 
also provides Quality of Service (QoS) in voice 
communications. The comparison between the LTE radio and 
UMTS functions is best viewed in LTE architecture explicitly 
in terms of higher user data plane bandwidth, longer UE 
connected state duration, use of Discontinuous Reception in  
eNB UE
E-UTRAN
EPC
S1
X2
PDN-GW
HSS
C-GRID
IPG-AKA
MME 
SGW
Serving 
Gateway
 
Fig. 3.  LTE Architecture with IPG-AKA 
the connected state, Medium Access Control (MAC) level 
identity and Radio Network Controller (RNC). Even though 
the 3GPP committee has framed the stringent mobility 
procedures, vulnerabilities still exist during LTE handover 
[32] and seamless connectivity procedure. There is certain 
handover [33] procedures as S1 and X2 wherein S1, the 
message exchange occurs multiple times by contacting MME. 
It brings out a longer handover delay which in turn results in 
performance degradation as the location between the MME, 
and Home eNB (HeNB) is far away. In X2, the handover is 
done among eNBs. 
A new key management mechanism is devised for the 
handover keying purpose. There are two different ways for the 
keying process, vertical and horizontal keys to derive the new 
eNB keys. To achieve secure communication between a user 
and eNB, an MME and the UE shall derive a KeNB and a Next 
Hop (NH) parameter from the KASME, which gets derived by 
the UE and the MME, whereas NH Chaining Counter (NCC) 
is associated with each KeNB and the NH parameter. The 
KASME derives the KeNB, and it gets associated with a virtual 
NH parameter with NCC value that is equal to zero. During 
the initial set-up, both the UE and the eNB use KeNB, which is 
utilized for the secure communication in on-air surface, 
whereas during handover session keys are employed. Here in 
this set-up UE and eNB with the use of session keys produce 
the KeNB in LTE for the secure communication. 
All the above-mentioned keys are derived from the static 
LTE-K that stays constant throughout the LTE 
communication. Thus, the impact of a compromised LTE-K 
may compromise all derived keys [11]. In other words, the 
single key problem in LTE can lead to the compromise of the 
entire key sets derived during an LTE lifetime for a UE. To 
address the static LTE-K problem, we propose a table based 
dynamic key generation mechanism (IPG-AKA), which in 
turn changes LTE-K at a periodic interval of time. A 5x5 or 
7x7 C-GRID must be maintained for every UE in both UE and 
its corresponding MME as shown in Fig 3.  
This C-GRID acts as the source material to generate a 
different set of LTE-K to enhance LTE security. The LTE key 
hierarchy and its security are enhanced through a C-GRID 
based key generation as shown in Fig. 4. The proposed  
IPG-AKA grid hierarchy includes various keys such as 
 KeNB -  a security key generated from KASME by UE and 
MME 
 KNASint - a NAS traffic integrity protection key derived by 
UE and MME from KASME 
 KNASenc - a NAS traffic encryption key derived by UE and 
MME from KASME 
 KUPenc - a User Plane traffic protection based encryption 
key derived from KeNB by UE and eNB 
 KUPint - a User Plane traffic integrity protection key 
derived from KeNB by Donor eNB (DeNB) and Relay 
Nodes (RN) 
 KRRCin - an RRC traffic protection integrity key using Key 
Derivation Function derived by UE and eNB from KeNB 
 KRRCenc -  an RRC traffic encryption key derived by UE 
and eNB from KeNB 
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LTE-K
Key Fetched
CK, IK
KASME KNASenc / KNASint
KeNB /NH, NCC KRRCenc, KRRCint, KUPenc
KRRCenc,  KRRCint, KUPencKNASenc /KNASint
RRC Signaling, U-Plane Protection
NAS Signaling Protection
USIM / AuC
UE / HSS
UE
eNB
UE / MME
C-GRID
Here, NH ensures forward key security in the LTE that is 
agreed upon by UE and MME. Finally, the key KeNB* supports 
horizontal and vertical key derivation in LTE that was derived 
by UE and eNB. A sample C-GRID from which the LTE-K is 
generated is shown in Table II. 
The C-GRID is populated with a set of binaries that are 
multiples of 8. The grid can be any ‘n x n’ matrix; here a 5 x 5 
and a 7 x 7 C-GRID are considered to brief the function of the 
key grid and the following LTE-K derivation. Each position in 
the C-GRID holds binaries denoted by a symbol as reflected in 
Table II. The ‘ϕ’ value in the key grid always accounts for a 
null value. Any combination of the characters of the alphabet 
fetched from the grid will be fed as input to the proposed  
C-GRID based key generation function to generate a 256 bits 
dynamic LTE-K before every authentication initiation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Pseudo dynamic LTE-Key Hierarchy 
TABLE II 
C-GRID WITH ACTUAL SEEDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
                                     SEED POSITIONS IN C-GRID 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Algorithm 1:  C-GRID Generation  
  Input: Variable bit elements  
  Output: C-GRID as a table 
  1: Start GRID Generation 
  2: Initiate 'n x n' matrix as GRID Layout 
  3: Setup GRID as variable bit columns  
  4: for ith column (23*i) sets the capacity of       
      the column 
  5:     for each column do  
  6:          null(ϕ) value placement 
  7:      end for 
  8: end for  
  9: Stop GRID formation 
     10: Stop GRID Layout  
     11: Flood GRID with binaries 
     12: Stop GRID Generation 
The placement of ‘ϕ’ in the key C-GRID uniquely 
differentiates the key grid among different users. The binaries 
required for LTE-K generation are fetched using the alphabet 
position value in the C-GRID as given in Table III.A sample 
LTE-K generation sequence from a 5 x 5 key grid is, 
24*4+16*4+16*4+8*4 = 256 bits. The combination of the 
bits can be fetched from any column as per the designed 
dynamic key feeder function. 
A. IPG-AKA C-GRID generation algorithm 
Step 1: Initiate a 5 x 5 or 7 x 7 matrix based grid at the UE 
and HSS end. 
Step 2: Place a null value ‘ϕ’ randomly such that each row 
and column in C-GRID must have not more than one (ϕ) 
value. 
Step 3: Populate rest of the C-GRID positions with random 
alphabets. 
Step 4: Assign binary values to every alphabet on the 
predefined binary size as 8 bits, 16 bits, 32 bits (23 and above) 
respectively. 
 Step 5: Placement of mirror columns with same bit size in 
the grid helps us to increase the complexity of the grid and 
every grid must possess at least (n/2 – 1) mirror column. 
B. IPG-AKA C-GRID based key generation function 
Once a C-GRID is generated, a secret Key Sequence (KS) is 
formed for the C-GRID using a secret Key Feeder Function 
(KFF). Both KS and KFF are pre-shared along with the  
C-GRID in UE and HSS. The secret key sequence and feeder 
vary for every UE and an eNB pair. The secret key generation 
process based on a 5 x 5 C-GRID is described for a sample 
secret key feeder, “x = ((x*y+i)*(1024+i)*(i*j)) mod 4”. 
Assume that the secret key sequence KS, which is going to 
replace the static LTE key, takes the form: 
[C3,C1,C4,C3,C2,C4,C1, ….C2,C4,C3] whose size is 256 bits. 
The steps involved in dynamic LTE key generation from 
Table IV are as follows: 
Step 1: Find the null value ‘ϕ’ from columns C1 to C5 in  
C-GRID as shown in Table IV. 
 
 
 
8 
bits 
16 
bits 
24 
bits 
16 
bits 
8 
bits 
ϕ B E H T 
A M ϕ C D 
Q F J G ϕ 
V ϕ S L K 
R W B ϕ S 
8 
bits 
16 
bits 
24 
bits 
16 
bits 
8 
bits 
a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 
a31 a32 a33 a34 a35 
a41 a42 a43 a44 a45 
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55 
1551-3203 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2018.2817028, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
> TII-17-2276 < 
 
6 
 
TABLE IV 
C-GRID BASED LTE-K GENERATION 
8 
bits 
16 
bits 
24 
bits 
32 
bits 
24 
bits 
16 
bits 
8 
bits 
F C A W ϕ R W 
G E L O K ϕ M 
A ϕ E P S G S 
U H B S L Q ϕ 
R K N ϕ E Z H 
ϕ Q K D B Y K 
M D ϕ J N H Q 
 
  Algorithm 2:  Key Sequence Formation 
  Input: Elements from C-GRID 
  Output: Key Sequence 
      1: Start Key_Sequence frame  
      2: Initiate rand() for the 2x bits value  
      3: Form 256_bits pattern in multiples of 2x fields 
      4: Mix iterations like 22*4+23+24*2…  
      5: Store Sequence 
      6: Stop Key_Sequence frame 
Step 2: Compute the secret KFF for every column 
iteratively excluding the fields having a null value to fetch 
random binaries from C-GRID. 
Step 3: For every successive iteration, the KFF returns 
positions in C-GRID, which are mapped randomly to the  
pre-defined KS for a successful LTE Key generation. Binaries 
are to be taken from returned KFF values to generate the LTE 
Key. The sample procedure of a key sequence fetched from 
Table IV is presented in Algorithm 4.  
C. Properties of the Key generated from IPG-AKA C-GRID 
Repeatability: The sequence of numbers generated from  
the C-GRID possesses a unique generation technique, which 
produces different values for the same seed or initial value. 
Randomness: All the 256 bits generated through 
IPG-AKA scheme is independent and are uniformly 
distributed random variables that pass all the statistical tests 
for randomness. 
Storage efficiency: Key sequence generation only follows 
look-up operation and the space required for storing the 
resultant values retains the same; so, IPG-AKA is more 
efficient in terms of storage & key generation when compared 
with the existing approaches 
Disjoint sub sequences: In the proposed IPG-AKA, by having 
a single key or a part of the key, next key cannot be generated 
and no correlation exists between simulations with different 
initial seeds. 
Long Period: If a pseudo-random number sequence uses finite 
precision arithmetic, the sequence will repeat itself with a 
finite period and this will be much longer than the number of 
random numbers needed for the simulation. 
 Insensitive to seeds: C-GRID formed in IPG-AKA scheme is 
insensitive to the initial seed value since, for the same seed  
IPG-AKA generated two different values, thereby indicating 
non-dependency of the period and randomness. 
Portability: In IPG-AKA, by having the same C-GRID and 
key generation function we can generate the same key 
sequence in ‘n’ number of machines. This conveys the 
evidence of generating the same key if C-GRID & key 
generation function matches. 
Homogeneity: All the keys generated from IPG-AKA scheme 
imply the randomness of the sequence of all bits. 
IV. THE PROTECTED IMSI DATA 
The first dispute resolved through IPG-AKA is single static 
key problem and the second issue addressed in this paper is 
the protection of PII. User privacy is the key problem that 
needs immediate attention in the future interconnected 
networks. In LTE network, the PII of users is vulnerable 
through the exposure of IMSI over the air. When an adversary 
gains access to an IMSI, it is possible to track all the services 
subscribed by that user. In the proposed scheme shown in Fig. 
5, the IMSI is sent over the air implicitly by concealed it with 
nonce through following steps: 
Step 1: When a UE attempts to enter the LTE network’s 
range, the MME sends a user identity request to the UE with 
the following four parameters as a large prime ‘p’, two  
  Algorithm 3:  Key Generation from C-GRID at HSS 
  Input: C-GRID 
      Output: LTE-K 
  1: Start Key_Generation_256 bits 
  2: Initiate Key_Sequence Fetch 
  3: if (Key_Sequence = Found) 
  4:            Fetch Key_Sequence 
  5: else 
  6:       if (New Member = 'Yes') 
  7:               Frame new Key_sequence 
  8:       end if 
  9: else 
     10:     Reject 
     11: end if  
     12: Finish Key_Sequence Fetch 
     13: Start Key_Sequence Splitting 
     14: Divide Key_Sequence into Alpha_fields 
     15: Initiate Bitwise Fetch on Alpha 
     16: for Each Alpha_fields do 
     17:    if (Previous value Fetched is from ith column) then     
     18:               fetch Next Value from n-ith column 
     19:    end if 
     20: Finish Alpha_fields Fetch 
     21: Stop Key_Sequence Splitting 
     22: Merge Key_Sequence by Alpha_fields 
     23: Stop Key_Generation_256 bits 
Algorithm 4: Key formation sample 
Input: C-GRID 
    Output: LTE-K 
1: for (i = 0 to n) 
2:     for (j = 0 to n-1) 
3:          While (C[j][i] != ‘ϕ’) 
4:              y = (y * x) + ( y + x) 
5:   x = (( x * y + i) * ( 1024 + i)  * (i * j)) mod 4 
6:              select n variables 
7:           end while 
8:       if (required variable selected == ‘Yes’) 
9:            Exit 
   10:     else 
   11:          go to step 3 
   12:     end if 
   13:   end for 
   14: end for 
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Fig. 5.  Message exchanges of IPG-AKA 
computed variables (α, β), a time stamp and its signature 
signed by a trusted authority to support the MME 
authentication to UE. 
Step 2: The UE computes [r = α k mod p and t = βk * IMSI] 
and sends the computed values (r,t) in the user identity 
response message. Here the computations are done with 
Mobile Equipment’s (ME) IMSI and therefore the IMSI is 
shared with the MME in a secured way. 
Step 3: On receiving the user identity response the MME 
computes the inverse process as t * (rs)-1 = IMSI where ‘s’ is 
the secret key pair of ‘β’ and hence the IMSI is obtained at the 
MME. Followed by this, the MME forwards the BS 
authentication data request to HSS with the IMSI, SNIdentity 
and the UE’s network type. 
Step 4: The HSS performs the SNID authentication, and on 
success, it retrieves the LTE-K from its database and 
computes the KASME using sequence number, RAND, AUTN 
and gains an authentication vector. Then the authentication 
vector with RAND, AUTN, KASME, eXpected RESponse 
(XRES) is sent to MME in the authentication data response 
message. 
Step 5: The MME fetches the RAND, AUTN from the 
received AV and adds KSIASME and forwards these parameters 
in the user authentication request message to UE. 
Step 6: The UE computes the Cipher Key (CK) and 
Integrity Key (IK) using its LTE-K and received RAND. On 
receiving the KSIASME value, the UE can generate the similar 
KASME key at the UE side. Finally, UE sends the RESponse 
(RES) message to MME. 
Step 7: The MME on receiving the UE response message, 
compares the RES parameter with its XRES value; if it 
matches, then the UE is authenticated successfully or else the 
access request will be denied by the MME. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Fig. 6.  Intruder simulation for IPG-AKA 
The security verification of IPG-AKA mechanism is done 
using AVISPA [34] tool. The entities involved in the proposed 
IPG-AKA mechanism are ME/UE, MME, and HSS. The  
IPG-AKA protocol specification comprehends an environment 
that includes the transition to every role, corresponding 
sessions, the intruder knowledge, and the environment. The 
protocol is verified for a specific secrecy and authentication 
goal specified in goal section.  Finally, the IPG-AKA protocol 
is checked with all back-end servers using various attacker 
models like known cipher text attack and cipher text only 
attack for key secrecy & authentication. The results have 
shown that the proposed IPG-AKA mechanism is safe and has 
bounded some sessions. The intruder simulation scenario in 
which the proposed IPG-AKA verification was done is shown 
in Fig. 6. 
A. Computational Complexity of C-GRID 
The computational complexity of the C-GRID based LTE- 
K generation is analyzed with a 5 x 5 sample grid consisting of 
360 bits (8*5+16*5+24*5+16*5+8*5 = 360 bits). This actual 
grid size includes the NULL value in every grid column. In a 
practical scenario, intruder requires 2256 iterations to identify a 
security key of 256 bits size that is derived from the grid. 
However, with the IPG-AKA mechanism, the complexity of 
any intruder guessing the security key is increased from 2256 to 
2360 iterations for a 5 x 5 grid, as he must break both the grid 
and key to generate future keys. The intruder key computation 
complexity increases with increase in the grid size. The LTE-
K secret key derived from the grid, being valid for a short time 
span is unbreakable in polynomial time, i.e. time taken to 
compute 2256 iterations. Added to this advantage, the 
complexity of the C-GRID is further enhanced by NULL 
value placement in every grid column where the null value 
placement position varies for every column of a grid and 
varies across different grids. To locate the NULL value’s 
position in a single grid column, it takes “2bitsize * number of 
rows * number of characters of the alphabet” number of 
UE MME HSS
r = αk mod p 
t = βk * {IMSI} 
{ p, α, β }, Sign, 
Timestamp
User identity request
User identity responce
{r,t} t *(r
(s))-1 = IMSI
Authentication data request
      IMSI, SN Identity, 
Network Type Generate AV; 
RAND, AUTN, 
XRES, KASME 
Authentication data response
(AV(s): RAND, 
AUTN, XRES, 
KASME)
AUTN = SQN Ɵ AK || 
MAC 
MAC = f1 (K, SQN || 
RAND) 
XRES = f2 (K, RAND) 
CK = f3 (K, RAND) IK 
= f4(K,RAND) KASME = 
KDF(SNID – ID, CK || IK)
User authentication 
request
RAND, AUTN, 
KSIASME 
Verify AUTN 
and Compute RES 
User authentication 
response
Compute CK and 
IK, and KASME 
Compare RES 
and XRES 
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computations. Additionally, a 5 x 5 GRID contains 2288 values 
excluding the null values, which creates 25 times more than the 
required 2256 bits key. Therefore, the illegitimate calculation of 
security key from the C-GRID in IPG-AKA mechanism is not 
possible.  
B. Mathematical Analysis of C-GRID 
 The security breach in IPG-AKA mechanism is evaluated 
and the breach time is computed as shown in Equation (1). 
          Breach Time = Ʃ(µB * EC * ER * E * NV)        (1) 
 where,  
     µB = Number of bits ∈ Exponent 
     EC = Number of elements ∈ a column 
     ER = Number of elements ∈ a row 
     E  = All possible elements ∈ the C-GRID as 26 
    NV = Number of null values 
An algorithm ‘A1’ when solves the C-GRID in polynomial 
time ‘Pt’, then ‘Pt’ is taken as the reference index to refresh 
the key ‘LTE-K’ (or) the Time to Live (TTL) of the key.  
Considering a time ‘t1’, which is required to compromise a 
single position P1 = {232 * (nxn) * 26 * n} of a grid, then the 
total time required to compromise the entire grid is presented 
in Equation (2). 
                    Total time T’ = Σ{t1,t2,t3…tn}                 (2) 
  where ‘n’ is the number of positions in the C-GRID. 
Lifetime of LTE-K = {(Time taken to breach  2256)*            
(iteration for the key sequence)*(Grid Complexity)}     (3) 
Using Equation (3), the lifetime of the LTE-K is 
determined, where a polynomial algorithm ‘A1’ takes 
polynomial time ‘Pt’ for computing the position ‘P1’ either 
sequentially or exponentially. So, it is theoretically impossible 
to find the LTE-K in the polynomial time. 
 The forward and backward key secrecy is maintained as it is 
impossible to break the key sequence besides it takes 2256 
iterations to compromise a single key. So, the security level is 
considerably high as it uses a randomized KFF that inhibits 
breaking the key sequence using forward or backward keys.  
Throughput = (No. of messages * Security level) ∕ Lifetime  (4)  
        Nk = {(  -1)*( Nc  )*(Nmc)*(E)}                         (5) 
where,  
        Nk = Number of unique keys of C-GRID 
        Nc = Number of columns 
      Nmc = Number of mirror columns 
        E  = All possible elements in position 
Equation (4) & (5) signifies the throughput and the number 
of unique keys generated from a C-GRID for a user 
respectively. Though the keys generated are considerably 
limited, the generated keys are random and independent 
enough. Thus, no relationship exists between the generated 
keys. 
C. Security Analysis of IMSI Protection 
1)  Encryption and Decryption 
In IPG-AKA, the cryptosystem is proposed in terms of  
4-tuples as (p, α, s, β), where ‘p’ is a large prime number that 
describes which Z*p group is used, α is an element of order n 
in the group Z*p, ‘s’ is a random integer with ‘1 ≤ s ≤ n-1’, and  
β = αs. If ‘p’ is primitive, then n = p-1. Conversely, this is not 
required, and ‘n’ may be chosen to be smaller than ‘p-1’ for 
increasing efficiency. The public key is (p, α, β) and the 
private key is ‘s’. 
The IMSI must be an integer between 1 and p-1, an element 
of Z*p for encryption purpose and is split into blocks if larger 
than ‘p-1’. If the IMSI is a key for a symmetric cipher, then it 
is well known to be a member of Z*p. Further, restrictions like 
‘IMSI is a member of α’ can be imposed which is not 
recommended often. In this kind of restriction α being non-
primitive, only ‘n’ of the ‘p-1’ members of Z*p will be in ‘α’ 
where no element of ‘α’ can be converted to IMSI. Rising ‘α’ 
to the power of the IMSI does not work since a discrete log is 
required to retrieve the original IMSI. 
The encryption process requires a random integer  
k ϵ [1, n-1] in addition to the public elements ‘p’ and ‘α’. The 
encryption (E) function is shown in Equation (6). 
Ek(IMSI) = (αk(IMSI*β)k) and D(u,v) = u-s*v   (6) 
where, all operations are done as mod p in Z*p 
The decryption function (D) will recover the actual IMSI from 
Equation (7) & (8) 
u-s = α-ks = (αs)-k = β-k                                        (7) 
        D(Ek(IMSI)) = u-s*v = β-k * IMSI *βk = IMSI             (8) 
2) Security 
If any intruder can get the private key ‘s’, it is possible to 
decrypt the IMSI. Since the public key includes β = αs and α, 
finding the private key ‘s’ from the public key amounts to 
computing a single discrete logarithm in α. For this reason, ‘n’ 
and ‘p’ values should be very large, which is the runtime of 
square root discrete log algorithms and index calculus discrete 
log functions respectively. To break the cipher text (u, v) = 
(αk, IMSI * βk), it would suffice to find β-k because of IMSI = v 
* β-k. But βk is needed to compute inverse successfully. One 
can find ‘k’ by computing the discrete log of u = αk base α, 
but this may not be significant. The complexity of cracking a 
cipher is equivalent to solve a Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem, 
given αk and β = αs, determine αks = βk. Solving a DH problem 
requires discrete log and it has been proved highly secure. 
Moreover, the proposed cryptosystem is too difficult to crack 
because of being like DH problem that is known to be highly 
secured. 
3) Efficiency  
Considering a cryptosystem (p, α, s, β) designed in IPG-
AKA scheme, where n = |α| is the order of α. The encryption 
process involves two exponentiations and one multiplication 
in Z*p. Since the exponent ‘k’ is chosen between 1 and n-1, 
using a large value of ‘n’ will slow down the exponentiation 
and in turn, slows down the encryption. A single 
multiplication cannot be significantly compared with the two 
exponentiations. Decryption involves one exponentiation, one 
inversion and one multiplication in Z*p. The private key ‘s’ is  
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TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF IPG-AKA WITH OTHER AKA SCHEMES 
Security Requirements EPS AKA Enhanced 
EPS-AKA 
IPG 
AKA 
Authentication    
Integrity    
Confidentiality  except 
for IMSI 
  
Privacy    
Security against MitM 
 

 

 
Security against Replay 
attack 

 

 

 
Forward Security    
Backward Security    
Solution for single 
 key problem 

 

 

 
Security against DoS 
attack 

 

 

 
the exponent, and it is selected between 1 and n-1. So, 
choosing a smaller value for ‘n’ will decrease the decryption 
time. Choosing a ‘s’ with very lesser 1’s in its binary 
representation, and by doing modular exponentiation, 
computation time can be significantly reduced. Multiplications 
involved in Z*p are faster for a small value of ‘p’, so 
decreasing the value of ‘p’ will decrease the time required for 
decryption. To achieve optimal performance, developers 
decrease p where n = ‘p-1’, or increase p where  
n < p-1. However, the latter choice is uncommon, and it is not 
preferred in practical implementation scenario as faster index 
calculus discrete log method depends on ‘p’ and not on ‘n’. 
D. Security level comparison of the proposed scheme with 
existing schemes 
From Table V, unlike EPS-AKA mechanism, enhanced  
eEPS-AKA mechanism provides privacy and defends against 
MitM, replay, DoS attacks but does not solve the single key 
problem. Whereas, IPG-AKA protects PII and also provides 
an efficient solution for single key problem (via C-GRID). For 
the verification and efficiency of our protocol, we conducted 
further analysis and prove that breach time of C-GRID 
increases exponentially which is a guarantee of the security of 
our approach. However, due to space constraints, we are 
unable to include these results here. 
VI. EMPIRICAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Here the complexity of performing a security breach refers 
to the number of iterations required to find a secret key. In  
Table VI,  we summarize the overall security aspects of  
EPS-AKA and the proposed IPG-AKA. Since no dependency 
exists between the source materials generated during  
IPG-AKA mechanism, forward key chaining and backward 
key chaining are not possible. This indicates that IPG-AKA 
outperforms EPS-AKA. 
A statistical inference based on the observed data of initial 
authentication in IPG-AKA and various other authentication 
methods like EPS-AKA and SE-AKA are presented in Fig. 7. 
 
 
TABLE VI 
IPG-AKA OVER EPS-AKA WITH RESPECT TO LTE-K 
Attribute EPS-AKA IPG-AKA 
Key Size (bits) 256 256 
Scalability No upto 768* 
Iteration 2256 2256*288 
Time for Key  
Generation (in sec) 0.06 0.08 
Complexity Level O(n) O(n3) 
Key Derivation No Yes 
Key Change No Yes 
Key Lifetime Permanent Dynamic 
Time to  
Compromise Polynomial Exponential 
                                         *Calculated for 7x7 C-GRID 
 
Fig. 7.  Initial authentication time for AKA mechanisms 
It is evident that though the time required for authentication 
process is slightly higher, the security vulnerability 
preventions make it worth using. The IPG-AKA load on MME 
for a minimum set of users is the same initially as other 
protocols, but when the number of mobile users performing 
authentication increases, the load imposed on MME due to 
IPG-AKA will raise to some extent when compared to EPS-
AKA and SE-AKA as shown in Fig. 8 which can be neglected 
with the security stand it provides. From Fig. 9, it is inferred 
that authentication load imposed on HSS by IPG-AKA is 
approximately equal to SE-AKA and EPS-AKA irrespective 
of the number of users and time required to perform 
authentication. Moreover, the LTE-K generation from the C-
GRID does not impose any expensive modifications in both 
cost and architectural level at HSS. 
As shown in the Fig. 10, it is explicit that the time taken for 
generating key is proportional to the size of the C-GRID. 
Since the difference between times required for the key 
generation for different grid sizes is not negligible, the size of 
the grid must be chosen according to the degree of the security 
demanded. As the grid size increases, the security also 
increases along with the time parameter. The bandwidth 
consumption for the existing EPS-AKA mechanism is 
compared with the proposed IPG-AKA mechanism using 
different set of inputs at a different mean density as shown in 
Fig. 11. 
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Fig. 8.  Authentication load at MME 
 
Fig. 9.  Authentication load at HSS 
At low mean density (say, 50/km2) there is no huge 
difference initially but as the number of iterations increases, 
the bandwidth consumption of IPG-AKA gradually rises 
which is negligible. But at a high mean density (say, 500/km2), 
despite low bandwidth consumption by IPG-AKA at the start, 
there is a notable increase in consuming bandwidth as the 
iteration increases. Though the bandwidth consumption of 
IPG-AKA is somewhat high, it significantly protects the user 
identity and privacy issues making it a trustworthy 
mechanism. 
Fig. 10.  Key Generation time for various size of C-GRID 
 
  TABLE VII 
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF IPG-AKA WITH RESPECT TO LTE-K  
Attack Type Intruder 
Knowledge 
Protection 
Chosen Cipher 
text 
Cipher 
C1, C2  
Protected by  
Dynamic Key hierarchy  
Known & 
cipher text only 
No similarity as there is no 
relation between the keys & 
Cipher text 
Forward and 
Backward 
Secrecy 
Key 
K1, K2, K3 
No common parameters exists, 
Dynamic Key sequence formation 
 
Spoofing Key K1, K2, 
Cipher C1, C2 
and Plain Text 
P1 & P2 
Key freshness in KS 
CKA Resolved through C-GRID 
complexity 
MitM &  
Session 
Hijacking 
Dynamic key freshness in Key 
sequence  
 Fig. 11.  Bandwidth Consumption at MME after IPG-AKA 
To illustrate the security strength of our scheme, in table 
VII we have discussed the security provided by our scheme 
against the several attacks. The future computation cannot be 
intercepted or identified even if the primitive parameters like 
keying elements and other processed materials like cipher 
texts are known to attacker. It is because the C-GRID of the 
proposed IPG-AKA scheme provides a dynamic key hierarchy 
that adaptively changes the key sequence, which provides 
protection against most of the known attacks. The proposed 
key hierarchy is independent of the past parameters and 
freshness is always maintained through the dynamic source 
key. Forward and backward secrecy is achieved through the 
Key Sequence formation that dynamically alters the key 
fetched from the C-GRID based on the bit size. Thus, IPG-
AKA framework is completely secure against active attacks 
like spoofing, sniffing, Compromised Key Attack (CKA), 
MitM attack and eavesdropping. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Owing to the broadcast nature of radio propagation 
channels in LTE networks, the transmission medium is 
susceptible to attacks such as eavesdropping, jamming, and 
privacy theft. So, there exists need for countermeasure 
development to evade these attacks by not relying on stagnant 
security constituents, not exposing the exploitable constructs 
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of secure communication and making security 
countermeasures harder to the adversary. Thus, the proposed 
IPG-AKA mechanism overcomes the single key problem and 
privacy theft issues prevailing in the existing EPS-AKA 
scheme thereby providing a reliable authentication framework. 
The performance evaluations, computational complexity and 
mathematical analysis of C-GRID shows approximately 30% 
improvement in the security of key management. Protocol 
verification through AVISPA tool proves that our proposed 
IPG-AKA scheme is highly resistant to the LTE security 
vulnerabilities. In addition to that C-GRID does not require a 
major architectural change in the security architecture of SAE, 
thus it can be easily adopted and scaled. This work will 
significantly contribute to the PII authentication and dynamic 
key generation that helps to secure the transmission medium 
from several attacks. The future work of this article is aimed at 
generating the components of the C-GRID using quantum bits 
thereby protecting the C-GRID from quantum computers as 
well. 
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